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Abstract
This paper studies the role of citizens’ demand for political information in elections
and provides a possible explanation for the poor empirical support encountered by political
economy models of income redistribution. It shows that incentives to gather political
information may derive from its relevance to private choices. Under quite mild assumptions,
the demand for political information is increasing in income. Information affects citizens’
responsiveness to electoral platforms, and vote-seeking political parties should take this into
account: as a consequence, redistribution will generally be less than predicted by the median
voter theorem. Moreover, in contrast with what most literature seems to take for granted,
an increase in inequality will not unambigously increase redistribution. Finally, introducing
endogenous information may lead some policy restrictions to have effects quite different from
those intended.
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￿Banca d’Italia, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction
1
Since the early stages of the economic theory of politics, Downs pointed out that in a
sizable electorate “the returns from voting are usually so low that even small costs may cause
many voters to abstain”. This carries implications not only for political participation but also
for the desire to be informed about political issues. If there is a cost of acquiring information
about the candidates and their platforms, then we should expect not only rational abstention
but also “rational ignorance” on political issues.
This consideration implies a substantial lack of information by citizens about candidates
and their proposals. The fact that many people actually vote and that political information
is still available in newspapers would be simply reduced to a matter of preferences: political
information may be enjoyable per se, not unlike sports news
2. This is equivalent to admitting
that preferences for political information, like all preferences, are outside the domain of
standard economic theory
3. If this was true then the chances of being informed or of showing
up at the voting booth could be expected to be independent of observable economic variables,
which seems to be at odds with most empirical research
4.
This paper argues that, apart from the obvious role of personal preferences, the demand
for political information can beexplained in termsof incentives. Themain point is that rational
4 This paper is part of a PhD dissertation at the London School of Economics. I am grateful to my advisor
Tim Besley for helpful discussions and valuable comments on my modelling attempts. I also received useful
comments and suggestions from Fabrizio Balassone, Massimo Bordignon, Andrea Brandolini, Giacomo Corneo,
Vincenzo Galasso, Roger Myerson, Torsten Persson, Jean-Francois Laslier, Federico Revelli, Kevin Roberts,
Cecilia Testa, Stan Winer and Alberto Zanardi as well as from participants in the Young Economists Meeting
in Amsterdam, the Workshop on Heterogeneous Interacting Agents in Genoa, the Summer School in Political
Economy at CORE, the Econometric Society Meetings in Cancun and Santiago, the EEA Meeting in Santiago,
the IIPF Meeting in Moscow, the SIEP Conference in Pavia, and seminars at LSE and STICERD. The usual
disclaimer applies. Financial support from the European Commission under the TMR scheme (Marie Curie
Fellowship) and from ESRC is gratefully acknowledged.
5 Analogously, Riker and Ordershook (1968) explain voters’ turnout in general elections by including a
sense of citizen’s duty in individuals’ preferences.
6 In the words of Downs, “a rational man can become well informed for four reasons: 1) he may enjoy
being well informed for its own sake, so that information as such provides him with utility￿ 2) he may believe the
election is going to be so close that the probability of his casting the decisive vote is relatively high￿ 3) he may
need information to in￿uence the votes of others (...)￿ 4) he may need information to in￿uence the formation of
government policy as a lobbyist. Nevertheless, since the odds are that no election will be close enough to render
decisivethe voteof anyoneperson, or the votes of all thosehe can persuade to agree with him, the rational course
of action for most citizens is to remain politically uninformed” (Downs, 1957).
7 See for example Matsusaka (1995) and the references given there.8
ignorance is the consequence of an arti¿cial separation between politics and the economy. It
seems rather intuitive that expectations on policies can be relevant to private decisions. This
generates a demand for political information to be used for private purposes. Under quite mild
assumptions, this demand is positively correlated with income: in other terms, we can expect
the rich to be systematically better informed than the poor, independently of any demand for
information purely as a consumption good.
This idea can help in explaining redistributive policies. In recent economic literature
explanations of redistribution based on political processes have gained increasing consent.
Whereas lobbying models have mainly been employed to explain redistribution towards
special interest groups, to study the determinants of general redistributive programmes the
main avenue seems to be analyzing voting decisions and political competition in general
elections.
Accordingto votingmodels of redistributionbasedonthe median voter theorem, income
inequality should increase redistribution as long as it increases the distance between average
income and the income of the pivotal voter (Roberts, 1977)￿ this result has been applied to
a variety of situations to explain the size of the public sector, low growth rates, increasing
intergenerational transfers and so on. However, it is also fair to say that this theory does not
enjoy solid support from empirical investigations. Even though the reduced forms referring
to speci¿c situations are generally compatible with the data, when moving to structural-form
analysis (linking inequality to some measure of redistributive transfers), support is generally
weak and coef¿cients often show signs different from those expected
5. There are various
possible explanations for this unsatisfactory empirical support
6￿ however, it seems clear that
the theory, though representing a useful benchmark, provides a simplistic representation of
how democratic systems work. Other institutional elements and country-speci¿c features are
likely to affect the policy outcomes.
It is worth remembering that this benchmark depends on some crucial assumptions that
have been challenged on a variety of grounds. First of all, it requires unidimensionality of
8 For examples of reduced form analysis see Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994).
Estimations of structural relationships between redistributive transfers and inequality are given in Perotti (1994)
and Lindert (1996).
9 Among other things, it is worth remembering that for some countries data are not completely reliable.9
the policy space. When public policy is considered in a multidimensional space, then an
equilibrium may not exist or it may assume very different characteristics
7. In particular,
political platformsproposed by candidates do not necessarily converge. Also, the median voter
theorem requires that political parties be perfectly able to commit to their proposed policies.
When candidates are unable to make credible commitments then the tendency to platform
divergence in equilibrium is reinforced
8.
This paper points in a different direction. The model unveils a possible relationship
between incentives to gather political information and preferences over redistribution.
Information acquisition might be non-neutral for voting outcomes: indeed, our model implies
a substantial heterogeneity in awareness on policies, which could affect political competition
and eventually policy choices. It will be shown how this may provide a possible explanation
of the weak evidence for the traditional benchmark.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie￿y discusses themain featuresof
the model of political information gathering, stressing its original elements as a theory of the
demand for information. Section 3 presents a simple model of Downsian political competition
in which both private and public decisions must be made by citizens. In Section 4 we derive
the demand for political information and show that incentives to be informed on politics are
increasing in agents’ initial endowments. In Section 5 we solve the model and analyse the
role of information on political equilibrium. Section 6 discusses the main implications of
the model for the interaction between gross income inequality and redistribution. Section 7
brie￿y discusses the main normative issues at stake in this analysis and the role of coordination
failures in information acquisition. Section 8 concludes.
2. Information on politics
Most models of voting assume perfect information. Citizens are therefore perfectly
informed on political platforms and perfectly able to understand the consequences of policies
on their own well-being. Models with asymmetric information have considered either a
representative voter imperfectly informed on candidates (e.g. Harrington, 1993, Morris and
: See for example Besley and Coate (1997).
; See Alesina (1987 and 1988) for partisan models of two-party electoral competition. Besley and Coate
(1997) also consider policy-oriented citizen-candidates.10
Coate, 1995) or ¿xed political alternatives (e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). Also,
information transmission in elections has been considered by Stromberg (2001a and 2001b),
who stresses the role of mass media as suppliers of information and their in￿uence on
economic policies, and Besley and Pande (1998), who tackle some normative issues.
This paper focusses on the demand for political information. It is clear that in
an economic theory of politics there is no simple explanation for any type of political
participation, where participation must be taken in the broad sense of voting, taking part in
political organizations, acquiring political information and so on.
One¿rst possibility, as noted, is that political information is demanded as a consumption
good and not for decision-making: most people seem to enjoy being informed on many things,
even when this does not enable them to make better decisions. In this case one should ask
about the nature of this good and, in particular, whether it is a normal good. This is clearly an
empirical matter￿ if, as seems reasonable, political information is a normal good, then the rich
can be expected to be more informed than the poor and therefore more responsive to policy
announcements: all the results we present in this work would be valid a fortiori.
In this paper, however, we refer only to information as it is considered in decision theory,
ignoring information as a consumption good and not relying on normality. In fact, the premise
that political information is rarely relevant to useful decision-making relies on an arti¿cial
modelling separation between politics and the economy. Our working assumption, instead,
is that political information may be acquired for private purposes and that this incentive is
relevant.
Many pieces of information may be relevant when voting even though they were
acquired for some other purpose. For example, information on ¿scal variables may be
relevant to investment decisions and at the same time convey information on economic policy￿
information on the quality of some public service (for example health) may be useful to know
whether it is worthwhile using privately available alternatives and at the same time convey
information on the effort of the current administration to provide good services. Moreover,
at election time, political information may be acquired to form more accurate expectations on
future policy: investment decisions today depend on expectations on future taxes￿ choosing
a public or a private school today involves expectations over the condition of the educational
system in a few years￿ and so on.11
Sometimes the behaviour of political agents may reveal, apart from policies, something
about theexternal world that isrelevant to privatedecision making. Political partieshaveevery
incentive to collect information for their own action, so accurate observation of their choices
can convey information on many variables that are unobservable (or too costly to observe) to
the private citizen.
In this paper the notion of information will have some characteristics not often
considered in the literature. First of all, information does not come effortlessly: agents must
spend effort and time to gather and process information. Secondly, acquiring information is
an activity with uncertain returns: more time and effort makes it more likely to get better
information, but there is no certainty about what and how much is going to be known. Third,
information is considered as freely accessible to all: this makes our analysis particularly suited
for information available in the mass media. In fact, the revenue of most newspapers and
broadcasts comes from advertising: attracting a larger public raises the value of units to sell
to advertisers
9. The consumer in this case does not pay information in cash￿ in any event, this
cost is quite low compared with some other opportunity cost.
It is important to stress that de¿ning the value of information and deriving a demand for
it requires dealing with some problems posed by its special characteristics. First, information
demand is a derived demand: information is valuable because it enables people to make better
choices
10. This means that information cannot be put in the commodity space when de¿ning
preferences. As a consequence, relevant nonconcavities may arise to complicate the analysis,
leading to an unsatisfactory theory overall
11. Second, to specify a model of information
demand we need a clear de¿nition of the information available, its costs and the decision
making process. Information is valuable only when there is uncertainty on variables that are
relevant to decision making. Third, there is no easy way to de¿ne the quantity of information.
Given a space of possible states 7, we can say that signal r is more informative than signal r
￿
when it induces a ¿ner partition of the state space: but this does not provide a complete order
of signals, as many partitions are simply not comparable with this criterion. Thus, a complete
< See the discussion of this point in Stromberg (2001a).
43 We are referring to the notion of information in decision theory. All other information can clearly be
included in the category of leisure.
44 See for example Radner and Stiglitz (1984).12
ordering of signals may be obtained only with reference to a score function, i.e. with reference
to how the signals are valuable in terms of the decisions to be made: this means that there is
no objective, permanently valid de¿nition of the quantity of information in economics
12.
Previous studies on information demand include Kihlstrom (1974) and Arrow (1986).
In Arrow, information is demanded for portfolio decisions under uncertainty. The analysis is
limited to this speci¿c case and considers a given speci¿cation for the utility function (CES).
Information is provided by a signal on returns, and the quality of the signal is given by its
precision. Kihlstrom provides a general theory of information demand about product quality,
when consumers are interested not directly in commodities but in some desirable attributes
they may have. The quantity of information is de¿ned using, as in Blackwell (1953), the
concept of suf¿ciency: if an observable random variable r is suf¿cient for r
￿
, then r delivers
more information than r
￿￿ In both papers the cost of a better signal is a monetary cost and there
is no uncertainty on the quality of the signal.
Our analysis of the demand for information will be quite simple but also suf¿ciently
general for our purposes￿ in a sense, it is in the Becker tradition of the study of individual
production functions: agents may “produce” information for their personal use by providing
the necessary inputs. We consider a generic state-dependent cardinal utility function and we
will explicitly introduce an effort dimension for information gathering and uncertainty on
information acquisition. This takes into account some elements that are particularly relevant
when information is gathered from mass media.
3. The general framework of the model
In the following model political competition is limited to a Downsian two-party system
with full commitment. Of course this implies that the model has all the limitations of the
Downsian analysis, which we do not intend to focus on here. It isinstead important to compare
our results with a standard Downsian model of political competition. Even though the analysis
is kept as simple as possible, this does not preclude the applicability of this framework to more
sophisticated models of political competition.
45 The Shannon measure of the quantity of information, derived in a different context, has proved to be of
little use in economic theory. See Shannon (1948).13
Our economy consists of a continuum of agents. Each agent’s preferences will be
represented by a continuous utility function
￿E cem@￿’LE m@￿ ￿ ￿e (1)
where x is a vector of private goods (with prices p), @ 5 ￿ ￿ d@c@o is a public policy
parameter and e 5 . ’d f c
￿
Zo is effort devoted to information gathering, with ￿ ’ / n 0 a
parameter of effortdisutility. We assume / tobe acost that is commontothe whole population
and distributed according to the function R/E￿cj2
/￿ with 7/ ’ i/mR/E￿cj2
/￿ : fj￿? n￿
0 ￿ R0E0cj2
0￿ is an idiosyncratic shock with 70 ’ i0mR0E0cj2
0￿ : fj￿? n. We assume
people have identical preferences: hence the only ex ante source of heterogeneity is their
initial endowment. An agent with endowment 6 has a choice set given by
f6 ’ i mT  ￿ 6E￿ ￿ Ze￿j (2)
where Z is a positive parameter, equal for all agents, re￿ecting the possible monetary costs
induced by information gathering (for example, via a reduction in labour supply)￿ Interpreting
the initial endowment as full income, we will summarize income distribution in the population
by a continuous density function sE6￿. Also, the public policy parameter @ is relevant to the
private choice of the bundle  .
For the moment let us focus on the ¿rst component of the utility function, neglecting
the choice of e and the role of Z￿ Let us also assume that @ is ¿xed and known with certainty.
From the constrained maximization of the utility function we get the optimal private choice
 WE@c6cT￿ and the indirect utility function T E@c6cT￿￿ We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1LE￿￿ 5? n is quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree 1 in  .
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Given the continuity of the functions involved, we can represent the preferred policy
of an agent with income 6 as a function @ ’ 5E6
> ￿c where > is the average income in the
population￿ we make the following assumption on policy preferences:
Assumption 35
￿ ￿ f￿14
Although Assumption 1 clearly restricts the behaviour pattern of our agents, it should be
noted that the class of utility functions we consider is still fairly general, comprising some of
the standard functions most widely used in economic models.
From Assumptions 2 and 3 it is clear that agents are heterogeneous in their preferences
over policy issue @. We can think of @ as any policy issue￿ we only require preferences on
@ to be somehow related to income￿ thus, @ could be some speci¿c type of public good or
a redistributive transfer in a second-best environment
13: hence the desired level of @ will be
d e c r e a s i n gi ne a c ha g e n t ’s own income and increasing in average income (the distance from >
measures how desirable redistribution is for an agent with income 6) and the policy preferred
by the pivotal voter (usually with income below the average) will depend on the distance of
that voter’s income from the average. Notice that assuming 5E￿￿ depending only on the ratio
6
>
also means that the level of wealth of a community does not matter for preferences over @( in
other words we exclude thepresence of any Wagner’s lawembedded in individual preferences.
Whenever we refer to a given income distribution sE6￿, we simply normalize > ’￿ c to avoid
confusion. For the rest of this section we indicate the distribution of the ideal @ (the argmax of
the indirect utility function) across the population with }E@￿.
Our agents act on the economy by their private decisions and may also affect the public
decision with their votes. From now on we also assume that @ is unknown.
In our environmenttherearetwo parties (￿and ￿) competingforof¿ce. They areableto
commit totheirplatformsand care onlyabout maximizing votes. Thus theyhavenopreference
for any platforms: these are used only instrumentally to convince voters.
Parties’ platforms are announced publicly but are observable only if some effort e
is devoted to information gathering. More precisely, we will assume that the probability
of observing the vector of announcements i@￿c@ ￿j is given by ^Ee￿,w h e r e^E￿￿ is an
increasing and concave function. One possible interpretation of this assumption is that parties’
communications are very often transmitted to voters only indirectly, by the mass media. Also,
political platforms are very complex and the ultimate effect on an agent’s ¿nances is never
very clear. Researchers use quite sophisticated models to approximate the effects of simple
46 One possible situation leading to this framework is the choice of the tax rate in a proportional tax system
with lump sum transfer and balanced budget. This is the situation analysed in Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and
Richard (1981).15
policies, so there is no reason why a voter should completely and immediately understand
political platforms and their consequences. Although this critique could be extended to many
other models in economics, it seems particularly relevant when we come to public policies,
because of their intrinsic complexity.
The timing of the model is represented in ¿gure 1: ¿rst of all Nature selects / for the
whole community and the idiosyncratic shocks 0 for each citizen. Citizens only learn their
own ￿￿Politicians, however, may observe the realization /￿Both citizens and politicians know
the distribution of policy preferences. In period 1 the two parties simultaneously announce
their platforms. Citizens spend their desired amount of effort in acquiring information and
afterwards decisions are made, i.e. private choices are undertaken and people cast their votes
on the basis of the information they have. Finally the announced policy of the winner party is
implemented and payoffs are realized for all citizens.
Note that the model can easily accommodate a series of complications that would not
change anything substantial. First of all, other sources of uncertainty could be added with
no signi¿cant consequences. For example preference distribution }E@￿ could be uncertain. If
there are two possible distributions }￿E@￿ and }2E@￿ with respective probabilities R and E￿￿R￿
then a state of the world would be de¿ned by realizations of information costs and preference
distribution. An agent could learn something by observing his or her own preferences but
would still be substantially uncertain, making information valuable. This possibility will be
considered in example 2.
Another possibility is to allow only for the observation of a signal r on platfoms, rather
than the platforms themselves. In this case, assuming that the joint distribution of @ and r
satis¿es the monotone likelihood ratio property, knowing r would reduce uncertainty and the
set of possible political equilibria, still making information gathering an activity with positive
returns. Note also that for our purposes the following analysis would be the same if the
function LE￿￿ was represented as LE m￿E@￿￿ where ￿E@￿ is any variable relevant to private
decision-making and affected by public policies (for example, the interest rate).
We will now start with the presentation of the information demand given its central role
in this model. Then we will proceed to solve the model backward.16
4. Private decisions and the demand for information
Private decisions are of two types: the choice of a commodity bundle x and the choice
of e￿ As will become clear, these two choices must be analyzed separately, as the choice of e
requiresde¿ninga notion of the valueof informationandthis, inturn, canbe de¿nedonlywith
respect to the maximum value function, when private choices have been made. Therefore, a
two-step maximization process will be used. Solving the individual decision-making process
backward, we start by considering e ¿xed and equal to h e￿ Then we can temporarily ignore the
role of e and Z￿
As we noted, the public policy variable @ is relevant to private decision making. Since
the decision has to be made before (or simultaneously to) the election, @ is unknown. The
motivation for information gathering is to make better private decisions. However, since
private choices depend on policies, it is convenient to start with political decisions.
A platform announcement is de¿ned as a pair i@￿c@ ￿j￿ Every announcement will
induce a partition of the whole population: let us indicate with ￿￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ and ￿￿E@￿c@ ￿￿
the size of the population that, if informed on the content of platforms, wouldvote respectively
for party ￿ and party ￿ when i@￿c@ ￿j is received.
Notice however that not all the people in ￿￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ and ￿￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ will be informed
on the platforms. Since there are no priors on parties’ location, ￿ and ￿ are just labels,
and therefore uninformed citizens are not responsive to parties’ proposals￿ we will interpret
this non-responsiveness as abstention, by assuming that any indifferent voters simply do not
vote. Actually, in our setting there is not much an uninformed voter can do apart from voting
randomly or abstaining. We then indicate with ?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ and ?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ the size of the
informed population voting for party ￿ and party ￿ respectively when i@￿c@ ￿j is received,
and with .?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ and .?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ their respective expected values when the size of the
informed population is uncertain.
Let us indicate with ￿E@￿m@￿c@ ￿￿ the probability that the platform of party ￿ wins given
that the platforms announced are i@￿c@ ￿j￿ Then we have
￿E@￿m@￿c@ ￿￿’
￿
￿ if ?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿ :? ￿E@￿c@ ￿￿
￿
2 if ?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿’?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿
￿
(3)17
Information is used by our agents in the best possible way￿ we also assume that each citizen
knows the distribution of public policy preferences }E@￿. Therefore agents are able to infer the
population partitions induced by any platform announcements. Since information is acquired
to forecast future policies we have the following assumption about the expected policy:
Assumption 4
@W ’ .E@m@￿c@ ￿￿’
￿




2@￿ ￿s .?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿’.?￿E@￿c@ ￿￿
￿
In other words, each agent knows the population partitions induced by any pair of
platform announcements, and, if informed about the platforms, can then forecast the future
policy. This means that the optimal private decision  W can be made contingent on i@￿c@ ￿j.
We will show later that the winning platform will depend on the realization of /￿ For
the moment let us just assume that the winning platform can be represented as a continuous
function @WE/￿ (this will be proved in Lemma 1).
Focussing for themoment only on thechoiceof commodities (i.e. on the ¿rst component











Note also that when ￿ is learned by each agent at the beginning of the game, the prior





Then we have the following de¿nition:
47 From now on we drop prices, as they do not vary in our analysis.18










For each given realization of / we will have a different ex post value of making an
informed private choice. But since the actual realization of / is ex ante unknown, the ex ante
value of information must be expressed in expected terms over /￿
It is then possible to prove the following:




Note that this result can be proved whether @WE/￿ is a continuous or a discrete function.
The only reason we are working with a continuous framework is to stress the fact that each
agent’s probability of being pivotal is zero. However, all the results are still valid with a ¿nite
number of citizens (and therefore a discrete @WE/￿￿ as long as we assume that the probability
of being pivotal in the election is negligible (see Appendix).
Now we are ready to turn to the effort allocation problem. Let us then remove the





















WE/￿￿R/E/m￿￿_/ n ^Ee￿￿E6ce￿ ￿￿e (6)19
Note that, by Assumption 1, we have that
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This means the value of information can be written as
￿E6ce￿’d 6E￿ ￿ Ze￿o￿
W
Therefore, the maximization problem (6) can be re-written as
4@ 
eM.
d6E￿ ￿ Ze￿oh T n ^Ee￿d6E￿ ￿ Ze￿o￿
W ￿￿e (7)
Solving this problem, we obtain the optimal effort function eWE6c￿￿ (remember that agents
are heterogeneous in 6 and ￿￿￿ This then gives the probability of being informed on political
platforms ￿E6c￿m/￿’^EeWE6c￿￿￿c where conditioning on / indicates that there is one such
function for each realization of /￿ In particular, to link the probability of being informed to
policy preferences, it is essential to understand how effort choice is dependent on the initial
endowment of agents and therefore to calculate
_eWE6c￿￿
_6 ￿20
Proposition 2If ￿tt￿4T|￿L?￿ is satis¿ed then
_eWE6c￿￿
_6 : f and
_eWE6c￿￿
_￿ ￿ f and therefore the
probability of being informed on political platforms ￿E6c￿m/￿ is such that ￿
￿





Before concluding this section, let us recall that we are dealing with the private value
of information￿ however, since the number of citizens is very large (it is actually in¿nite)
any incentive to acquire information for political purposes (i.e. for instrumental voting) is
negligible, in the sense that the probability of being a pivotal voter is zero in a continuum of
agents. Therefore￿E6c￿m/￿ fully representstheprobability each citizen hasof being informed
on political platforms.
5. Voting decisions and political competition
In this section we analyzethe political competition gameand citizens’ private and public
decisions. We will solve the game backward, deriving agents’ best responses and then the
political equilibrium.
5.1 Consequences
As we have full committment to platforms, the policy proposed by the winning party
E@W￿ is implemented after the election￿ if the two parties get an equal share of votes then each
policy is implemented with probability equal to ￿
2. Note that the population of voters consists
of those agents who actually vote, and is therefore a subset of the entire population.












5.2 Voting and private decisions
Since there are only two parties, strategic voting is equivalent to sincere voting. Agents







￿ if LE%WE@￿c@ ￿c6￿m@￿￿ ￿LE%WE@￿c@ ￿c6￿m@￿￿ : f
￿ if LE%WE@￿c@ ￿c6￿m@￿￿ ￿ LE%WE@￿c@ ￿c6￿m@￿￿ ￿ f





Voters who do not observe the platforms are indifferent between the two parties and therefore
abstain. Notice, however, the difference between the two types of behaviour: uninformed
agents cannot make their choice contingent on i@￿c@ ￿j and therefore cannot be responsive to
different platform announcements.
Optimal private decisions will be
 
W ’ @o}6@%%MfLE m@
W￿ (11)
for informed agents and




for the uninformed. These private decisions are made before elections
15. Hence, when making
private choices citizens do not know the election outcome, although they can form rational
expectations.
5.3 Information gathering
At this stage we have the process described in the previous section. Agents must decide
how much effort to devote to information gathering. Solving the maximization problem (7) we
derive the optimal effort of each citizen eWE6c￿￿ and then the probability of being informed
on platform announcement ￿E6c￿m/￿. At the end of this period the total population will be
divided into informed agents (those who observe the platforms) and uninformed. Note again
that more effort only implies a higher probability of being informed.
5.4 Platform announcement and political equilibrium
Parties announce their platforms simultaneously.
48 For our purposes they could also be simultaneous to elections.22
Remember that at the beginning of the game they both observed the realization of the





It is impossible to know ex ante who is going to be informed and who is not, because
this depends on the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks and because ^Ee￿ represents only
a probability of getting information
16. What the parties can do is to exploit the ex ante
information on observables E6 and /￿ and their relationship with the probability of being
informed. 0 is an idiosyncratic shock with no systematic relation with policy preferences, so
it is irrelevant for parties’ strategies





We assume parties are interested in maximizing expected plurality ￿E@￿c@ ￿￿’












where ￿E@￿c@ ￿￿represents theset of citizens choosing party ￿, given that platforms are E@￿c@ ￿￿￿
A Nash equilibrium in platforms E@W
￿c@ W
￿￿ must therefore satisfy
￿￿E@
W






￿￿ ￿c￿ ’ ￿c￿ (16)
Notice that from Assumption 2 the policy space admits a Condorcet winner
18. When
we say that a policy space admits a Condorcet winner we basically assume that everybody
in the population space is capable of choosing his or her preferred option in a pairwise
comparison. This is clearly not possible if some agents do not know what the available options
49 It should be noted that the process of information gathering is considered ex ante. In other words, if
a lucky agent observes the announcement immediately he will stop putting effort into information gathering,
before reaching the ex ante optimal level h￿= However, this interim process is not observable for the parties,
which can look at the situation only from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, since luck does not depend on policy
preferences, this consideration will be irrelevant when coming to political proposals.
4: Moreover we assume that only $ is observed.
4; See Gans and Smart (1996).23
are. However, we can still ¿nd a Condorcet winner given that any subset of the population still
satis¿es Assumption 2. Given our assumptions, theCondorcet winner is theplatform preferred
by the voter who is median in the set of the ex post informed voters ￿U￿ However, parties do
not know the identity of informed and uninformed citizens and therefore cannot say ex ante
what istherelevant set of voters. Sincethepopulation isvery largeand since both thepreferred
policy and the probability of being informed are monotonically related to income, we can ¿nd
afocal point for parties’ strategies. Clearly, thisnotion ofCondorcet winner doesnot attach the
same weight to every citizen, but takes into account the probability that citizens have of being
able to choose in pairwise comparison. The relevant set of voters is ex ante an unknown set￿
hence the parties maximize over the expected relevant set of voters. The identity of informed
and uninformed voters cannot be known ex ante, but the likelihood of being informed may be
taken into account in maximizing expected votes, and this is re￿ected in the payoff function in
the (15).
5.5 Characterization of equilibrium
In this section we derive some important properties of the equilibrium. An equilibrium
in this game is given by a platform announcement for each party
@
W
￿E/￿E ￿ 5i ￿c￿j￿c










We are interested in the political equilibria, and so we leave in the background the equilibrium
in private choices, which will not affect our results.
The existence of a “weighted Condorcet winner”, and therefore competition among
parties to reach it, ensures that political equilibrium will have some simple and intuitive
properties.24










Hence, parties will converge on the platform preferred by the expected median informed
voter. The argument for this convergence is identical to the standard Downsian one, the only
difference being that the relevant population distribution is weighted by the probability of each
citizen of being reactive to political proposals.
Given the continuity of the policy space and of the distribution function of the cost of
information, we can also prove the following result, which was used (but not proved) in the
previous section.
Lemma 1The political equilibrium of this game can be expressed as a continuous function
@WE/￿G7/ $ ￿￿
Proof. See Appendix.
Wecannowturn backto theissueofthevalueofinformation. In Proposition 1weproved
that the value of political information is increasing in each agent’s income￿ in Lemma 2 we
show that the value of information is positive, even if agents are able to understand they are
in a political equilibrium: rational expectations rule out all policies that cannot be sustained in
equilibrium, whatever the realization of random variables, but agents are still uncertain about
which equilibrium they are in.
Lemma 2In equilibrium the value of information on platforms is positive.
Proof. Since the distribution ￿/E53￿E@￿￿ depends on the realized value of /,v o t e r s ,
who have rational expectations but do not know /c will expect to have in equilibrium @WE/￿￿
Anyway, informed voters can fully deduce @W from platform convergence. Uninformed voters
rationally rule out any other possibility apart from @WE/￿ but are still uncertain about the actual
@W . This fact gives a positive value to information about parties’ platforms.￿25
6. Implications for income redistribution
We can now turn to redistributive policies. As we noted earlier, little empirical support
has been found for positive models of income redistribution that are based on the median
income result: in general, redistributive policies do not appear to be very responsive to the
median/mean income ratio.
It is clear that many issues are at stake in democracies and that there is no simple way to
explain redistribution. However, in this section we want to ask if information on politics may
give some insights even in a simple one-dimensional framework.
It is possible to characterize the equilibrium in terms of the policy outcome in a precise
way and compare it with the outcome of a standard Downsian model with perfect information.
Proposition 4Let us indicate with @W
￿ the political equilibrium when the entire population is
informed on platform announcements. Then






Y/Y@ ￿ f , @W￿
/ ￿ f￿
Proof. See Appendix.
Political equilibrium in our game involves a public policy that will be, in general,
different from that preferred by the median voter over the entire population. The weight
attached to agents by political parties is increasing in their income, and therefore the pivotal
voter has an income higher than the median. As long as acquiring information has a cost, the
public policy will be bounded above by @WEf￿c which is lower than the median voter outcome.
This provides a microfoundation for the idea that richer agents somehow have more power in
the political process. This is an idea that has been recurrent in political economy but that has
never been explained or founded in a rigorous way
19.
Abusing of this result and interpreting non-responsiveness to policies as abstention in
general elections, we can link this idea to the stylized facts that abstention is more common
among low income agents and that countries with higher turnout tend to have higher levels of
4< See for example Benabou (1996).26
social expenditure
20. Anumber of papers have linked information to participation. In decision-
theory terms, being better informed allows better choices and therefore should increase the
probability of voting (see Matsusaka, 1995). When strategic interactions are considered, less
informed citizens might abstain in order to increase the probability of the better informed
being pivotal (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). This, however, is only true if citizens’
preferences are not too heterogeneous (see Caillaud and Tirole, 1997). In terms of our model,
if we introduce a cost of voting that is independent of policy preferences, then we can easily
link our results on rational ignorance to actual voter turnout. This would deliver observable
conclusions about electoral participation and social spending. Interestingly, Lindert (1996)
¿nds evidence of this: “a stronger voter turnout seems to have raised spending on every kind
of social program, as one would expect if one assumed that the social programs cater to the
lower income groups whose voter turnout differs most over time and across countries”.
Another important conclusion of the analysis of redistributive policies in political
economy is that an increase in income inequality (measured as the ratio between the mean and
the median income) should lead to more redistribution. In comparing two income distributions







where 6￿ is the income of the pivotal voter under distribution s￿￿ The reason that the change
produces more redistribution is that the pivotal voter under s2 is poorer (being 6￿ :6 2c with
62 s.t.
U 62
6 s2E6￿_6 ’ ￿
2￿ and therefore his or her distance from the mean has increased.








It is clear that condition (17) does not imply condition (18) or viceversa. In general,
the foregoing analysis leads to a result of indeterminacy: a mean-median ratio increase does
not necessarily lead to more redistribution in a democratic system, as this will have two
contrasting effects: more inequality increases the middle classes’ desire for redistribution,
but it also means greater dispersion in the probability of being informed, resulting in parties
53 See Lindert (1996).27
targeting higher-income groups. Unfortunately, it is not possible to characterize the effects
of an increase in inequality better, if not in obscure and not very useful ways. However, this
indeterminacy should at least counsel more prudent use of voting models for comparing the
redistributive outcomes of different degrees of inequality. We can summarize this negative
result in the following proposition:
Proposition 5An increase in the mean-median income ratio is neither necessary nor suf¿cient
for more redistribution.
New elements come to play a role in our analysis￿ the way we look at inequality and
redistribution is substantially different from previous models. First of all the shape of the
function ￿E6￿ matters. Since the results are driven by the fact that ￿
￿
6 is positive, it can
be argued that traditional results are likely to be reversed when ￿
￿
6 is large enough. That
is, to be able to say anything about redistribution we must also be able to determine the
impact of income on the decision to acquire information. Clearly, this may depend on many
elements: a suf¿ciently high general level of education, for example, is an important condition
for widespread access to information and certainly raises the capability to extract information
from the news. In terms of our model, education can be thought to reduce the cost of acquiring
information. Also, the role of the supply of information should not be underestimated:
suf¿cientlyfree press andcompetition in theinformation market, for example, canincrease the
availability of good quality information and hence reduce the costs of information gathering.
In focussing on the formal aspects of electoral processes, thepolitical economy literature
seems to have neglected the role of factors that certainly matter for the proper functioning of
democracy: democratic decisions require not only that people go to the polls but also other
institutional elements, such as those that foster informed public opinion. Evidence concerning
the effects of information supply on citizens’ responsiveness and political participation is
provided in Larcinese (2000). Sen (1981, 1984) has pointed to the role that newspapers
may play in preventing famines, by increasing citizens’ awareness and therefore government
activity in prevention. Besley and Burgess (2001) ¿nd a positive correlation between
newspaper circulation and government responsiveness to natural calamities.
Another consideration is that focussing on median and mean incomes can be highly
misleading. It would be more appropriate to consider the whole income distribution, since the28
identity of the expected pivotal voter can be modi¿ed by changes outside the median-mean
range: changes in the distribution that leave both median and mean incomes unaltered may
nevertheless in￿uence policy choices by affecting citizens’ responsiveness in other parts of the
distribution, thus changing the identity of the pivotal voter.
This leads to another important consideration, namely that not only relative but also
absolute inequality matters. Two distributions with the same degree of relative inequality (as
gauged for example by Lorenz curves) may produce different political outcomes, because the
function￿E6￿is notnecessarilylinear, andwill therefore“weight”thetwodistributivepro¿les
differently. In section 3 we derived results on ￿
￿
6E6￿c but nothing general can be said about
￿
￿￿
6E6￿. That is, a change in the difference between mean and median income, leaving their
ratio unaffected, would change the political equilibrium in our model even when it would not
affect a standard Downsian model.
Furthermore the mean-median ratio (or distance) is not necessarily a good measure of
inequality
21. Indeed, we can think of an increase in inequality (in terms of Lorenz dominance,
for example) associated with a reduction of the distance between mean and median income.
However, as political equilibria have been derived in the literature in terms of this measure, it
has become standard to consider only mean and median income. Yet our analysis suggests the
need to considering the entire distribution. Further analysis is necessary to derive results in
this direction.
Since Proposition 5 isessentially anegativeresult, we nowusetwo examplesto illustrate
the possible implications of the foregoing analysis.
Example 1 (A poor majority).
Let us consider a population divided into two groups, ￿ and -, with respective income
6￿ and 6- and 6- :6 ￿( we also assume that ￿￿ :￿ -￿ The two sources of information
cost / and 0 now assume a ¿nite number of possible values￿ in particular 7￿ ’ i/uc/Mj
(with /u ￿/ M￿ and 70 ’ i0uc0 ￿c0 Mj with (0u ￿0 ￿ ￿0 M￿ and the respective probabilities
are RMcR u ’￿￿RMc^ Mc^ ￿c ^u￿ We then have the following possible realizations for the cost
54 For example it does not satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. See Lambert (1995).29





￿M ’ /M n 0M w.p. RM ￿ ^M
￿￿M ’ /M n 0￿ ’ /u n 0M w.p. RM ￿ ^￿ n ^M ￿E￿ ￿ RM￿
￿￿u ’ /M n 0u ’ /u n 0￿ w.p. RM ￿ ^u n ^￿ ￿ E￿ ￿ RM￿










We will also assume that the value of information and the income distribution are such that at





and at cost ￿￿u and ￿u all agents value information on political party platforms at more than
the cost of acquiring it, i.e.
e
WE6￿c￿ ￿u￿’e
It is immediately clear that with full information the Condorcet winner is the policy
preferred by the poor @W ’ @￿￿ Let us now analize imperfect information. Using Bayes’sr u l e ,




RM ￿ ^￿ n ^M ￿ E￿ ￿ RM￿
￿hE/Mmv￿u￿’R ’
RM ￿^u
RM ￿ ^u￿n^￿ ￿ E￿ ￿ RM￿
￿hE/Mmvu￿’f
Let us then consider the two possible realizations of /￿
Case 1: / ’ /M￿ Some agents will have a private cost ￿M and will have no incentive
to gather information. The rich with costs ￿￿M and ￿￿u will gather information. For a large
population, each agent’s probability of being informed can be translated into the fraction of30
the population that is informed. Therefore we have E^￿ n ^u￿￿- informed. In the same way
we have ^u￿￿ informed. If E^￿ n ^u￿￿- :^ u￿￿ then @W ’ @-￿
Case 2: / ’ /u￿ The poor with ￿ ’ ￿￿M stay uninformed while those with ￿ ’ ￿￿u
have a value of information greater than its cost and therefore acquire it. The rich with ￿￿M
and ￿￿u will acquire information. Let us now assume that ￿- ￿^ ￿￿￿. What happens to
agents with cost ￿uq Notice that those agents would receive a positive value from acquiring
information on party platforms. However, they also have degenerate beliefs on the realization
of /￿ Knowing that / ’ /u they learn that a fraction ^￿ of the poor are informed, and that
is enough to establish that @W ’ @￿￿ Therefore they do not need to gather information to be
informed on the policy, independently of their income, and can free ride on the group with
higher cost ￿ ’ ￿￿u . Only a fraction ^￿ of the poor and E^￿ n ^M￿ of the rich will be
informed, which ensures @W ’ @￿￿ Thus, we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 6Assume ^￿￿￿ :￿ - and E^￿ n ^u￿￿- :^ u￿￿. Then @W ’ @- w.p. RM and
@W ’ @￿ w.p. E￿ ￿ RM￿.
It is thus clear that, depending on the parameters, even a small minority of rich people
may be able to obtain their preferred policy. This is likely to happen when the majority of the
poor are not in a position to make relevant private decisions. If, for example, a majority of the
population is at a subsistence level of income, they have no incentive to be informed on public
policies, thus leaving public decisions to the rich minority, in spite of the fact that collective
decisions could signi¿cantly affect their welfare. When we compare this with the outcome
under full information, it is evident that the probability of having outcome @W ’ @￿ has been
reduced from ￿ to E￿ ￿ RM￿.
Example2(Constitutional restriction). Let usconsideragainapopulationdividedinto
richandpoor, withthesameassumptionsonpopulationdistributionandthecostofinformation
as in Example 1. We will now also see that other sources of uncertainty can be introduced and
that something can be learned about them from parties’ behaviour. Also, initial endowment
does not need to be income.
Agents have identical utility functions LESc,c}￿,w h e r eS is consumption, , is leisure
and } is a public good. Gross income and net income are respectively generated by agent ￿31
according to
6￿ ’ ￿￿E￿ ￿ ,￿
S￿ ’ 6￿E￿ ￿ |￿
where ￿￿ is the wage rate, E￿ ￿ ,￿ is labour supply (with total time normalized to ￿)
and | is a ￿at tax rate. The public good is produced with constant returns at unitary cost and,




Rich and poor are endowed with different wage rates ￿￿ ￿￿ -￿ That of the rich is
assumed given and common knowledge, while that of the poor is a random variable that can
assume two possible realizations: ￿￿ ’ ￿￿ w.p. R￿ and ￿￿ ’ ￿￿ w.p. E￿ ￿ R￿￿ with ￿￿ :
￿￿ ￿Noticethat nothing would changeif instead ofuncertainty on thewagerateweconsidered
any element of preferences, say intensity of preference for the public good by either of the two
groups.
We consider two possible regimes: in regime a a linear tax is levied on the entire
population and the revenue is used to produce the public good. In regime b a constitutional
restriction prevents taxation below a threshold level of gross income 6c so that if the poor have
wage rate ￿￿ they are not taxed, whatever the tax rate. Indicating this threshold with 6,w e
have
6-E￿-c|￿ : 6:6 ￿E|c￿￿￿
and 6￿E|c￿￿￿ : 6 ;|
Note that the public policy issue | is unidimensional, since there is a binary correspondence
between | and }￿
Case a: with full information | is known to everybody. Therefore each agent will
perform an individual optimization over labour supply, taking into account his or her own
wage rate andthe tax. The indirect utilityfunctionafter this process is givenby T E￿E￿￿|￿c}￿￿
Since preferences are assumed identical for all agents, when coming to the public policy issue32
we will typically have |￿ :| - (and }￿ :} -￿￿ Therefore the Condorcet winner is represented
by |W ’ |￿c and competing political parties will converge on |W. Let us now consider the
case of imperfect information. This is very similar to that analysed in the previous example.
Therefore, on the basis of Proposition 6, if we did not have uncertainty on the wage rate we
could have concluded that |W ’ |- w.p. RM and |W ’ |￿ w.p. E￿ ￿ RM￿￿ But now we have
to take into account that the optimal tax rate for each agent depends on the realization of the
uncertain wage rate of the poor. We will have







|-E￿￿￿ w.p. RM ￿ R￿
|-E￿￿￿ w.p. RM ￿ E￿ ￿ R￿￿
|￿E￿￿￿ w.p. E￿ ￿ RM￿ ￿ E￿ ￿ R￿￿




Note that the value of information for each rich agent is represented by
CE￿-￿’T E￿-E￿ ￿ |
W￿c}
W￿ ￿ d RM ￿ R￿T E￿-E￿ ￿ |-E￿￿￿￿c} -E￿￿￿￿
n RM ￿ E￿ ￿R￿￿T E￿-E￿ ￿|-E￿￿￿￿c} -E￿￿￿￿
nE￿ ￿ RM￿R￿T E￿-E￿ ￿ |￿E￿￿￿￿c} ￿E￿￿￿￿
nE￿ ￿ RM￿E￿ ￿R￿￿T E￿-E￿ ￿ |￿E￿￿￿￿c} ￿E￿￿￿￿o
The poor learn the realization of their own wage rate and therefore have one less source of
uncertainty. Then the value of information for each poor agent is given by
CE￿￿￿’T E￿￿E￿ ￿|
W￿c}
W￿ ￿d RMT E￿￿E￿ ￿ |-E￿￿￿￿c} -E￿￿￿￿
nE￿ ￿ RM￿T E￿￿E￿ ￿ |￿E￿￿￿￿c} ￿E￿￿￿￿
We are making the following assumption on the value of information:
￿M :C E￿-￿ :￿ ￿M :￿ ￿u :￿ u
￿M :￿ ￿M :C E￿￿￿ :￿ ￿u :￿ u33
Notealsothat thevalueofinformationfor therichinthiscaseisnotlimitedtoknowledge
of policies but extends to knowledge of an exogenous element (the wage rate of the poor) that
can be useful for some decisions and that is revealed by politicians’ behaviour.
Case b. Now we have a constitutional restriction that prevents the poor from being taxed
if they are endowed with the low income. The preferred tax levels will change accordingly.
Indicating with |￿
￿E￿￿￿ the tax rate preferred by group ￿ when their wage rate is low,
under the constitutional restriction we have |￿
￿E￿￿￿’￿:| ￿E￿￿￿￿ If the wage rate of the
poor is high then their preferred tax rate is not affected by the constitutional restriction, so
|￿
￿E￿￿￿’|￿E￿￿￿.
The preferred tax rate of the rich also changes. If the poor’sw a g ei sh i g ht h e na g a i n
the constitutional restriction has no effect: |￿
-E￿￿￿’|-E￿￿￿￿ But if ￿￿ ’ ￿￿ then
|￿
-E￿￿￿ ￿| -E￿￿￿ (assuming that the substitution effect dominates the income effect)￿
With full information the constitutional restriction is clearly favorable to the poor since
the new Condorcet winner will simply follow the preferences of the poor. Therefore the
equilibrium policy becomes |W ’￿w.p. R￿ and remains |￿E￿￿￿ w.p. E￿ ￿ R￿￿￿ When
introducing imperfect information, notice that under the constitutional restriction if the wage
rate realized for the poor is low, then they have no uncertainty over their own tax rate,
which is going to be zero independently of public choice. The poor can then perform their
preferred labour supply choice without information gathering: the value of information for
them becomes zero and therefore lower than the lowest possible realization for the cost of
information. If this is the case then the Condorcet winner is represented by |￿
-E￿￿￿￿ However,
if the realization of the wage rate is high then the poor will still gather information and
thereforetheCondorcet winneris|￿
￿E￿￿￿’|￿E￿￿￿ci.e. exactlythetaxratethatwouldprevail
without constitutional restriction. As a consequence, the political equilibrium is |￿
-E￿￿￿ w.p.
R￿ and |￿E￿￿￿ w.p. E￿ ￿R￿￿￿
The situation considering asymmetric information has been reversed. Now we can have,
with probability R￿c a deviation from |￿E￿￿￿( not, however, towards an increased tax but a
reduced one. Moreover, it is even possible that the constitutional restriction is harmful for the
poor. Without the constitutional restriction the (ex ante) expected tax rate is
.E|
W￿’|-E￿￿￿ RM ￿ R￿ n |-E￿￿￿ RM ￿ E￿ ￿ R￿￿34
n|￿E￿￿￿E￿ ￿ RM￿ ￿ E￿ ￿ R￿￿n|￿E￿￿￿E￿ ￿RM￿ ￿R￿





-E￿￿￿R￿ n |￿E￿￿￿E￿ ￿ R￿￿￿
We can easily have situations where .E|W￿ :. ￿E|W￿c (for example because |￿
-E￿￿￿ is
very low) and therefore a restriction which has been introduced in order to increase income
redistribution might eventually reduce it.
It is clear that a restriction on targeted bene¿ts instead of on the tax would have delivered
the same result. The basic insight is that to participate in public life people may need some
“selective incentives”, and an important aspect of public policies is whether or not they
generate such incentives.
7. Extensions on coalitions and opinion leaders
The solution concept used in the model is Nash equilibrium: nobody wants to deviate
unilaterally from his or her best response given the behaviour of other agents. It is well known
that Nash equilibria do not need to be ef¿cient, in the sense that Pareto improvements are
sometimes possible when agents are able to coordinate.
It should ¿rst be noted that in the model presented here this is not the case. If side
payments among citizens are not possible, then any agent would just prefer his or her ideal
level of @ to any other. Therefore, once an equilibrium (whatever it may be) has been reached,
there is no way to improve the condition of one of the citizens without putting somebody else
in a worse situation. This is a typical feature of all Downsian models
22.
It is useful to think of @ as a public policy grounded in a second best environment. This
creates the possibility that some public policy choices are more ef¿cient than others, in the
sense that they could Pareto dominate different outcomes if some form of compensation were
possible. Anyway, since we limit our policy space to one dimension (@)c then the conclusion
55 This is discussed in Besley and Coate (1998).35
must be that any outcome of the political process is Pareto ef¿cient. However, it is interesting
to note that the political outcome is not preferred by the majority of the population, i.e. there
are available alternatives that could potentially beat in pairwise comparison that selected.
Some progress could be made by recognizing that the political equilibrium of this game
does not need to be coalition-proof. Nash equilibrium is concerned with the behaviour of
single agents. We know that since the probability of being a pivotal voter is zero, nobody will
put more effort into information gathering than what is optimal from a private perspective.
However, if a large group of citizens with similar preferences can coordinate on acquiring
more information, this would shift the political equilibrium towards their preferred one. This
shift in political outcome could be worth the extra-effort spent in information gathering￿ the
problem is that information above the private needs is a public good, and individuals will fail
to coordinate without some speci¿c coordinating device.
However, in a world in which it is individually costly to gather information on political
platforms, it can also be too costly to coordinate people for acquiring information: moreover,
there may be other reasons why people might not be willing to coordinate on information
acquisition
23. The form of coordination one can imagine is directed to reducing the costs for
some groups: this is typically done by many organizations with an interest in policy choices.
Another way this coordination can, at least partially, take place, is by transmitting “cheap”
information. In other words, it might not be necessary to know and perfectly understand the
public budget and its implications in order to make a ”good” choice. If a pre-election stage
is added to our model, in which people can simply endorse parties and say “vote for B” or
“vote for A”, without any justi¿cation, this could change the political outcome, as long as the
announcements come from people whose preferences are known. We can think that a cheap
message (one that can be received at low cost), rather uninformative per se, can nevertheless
serve uninformed citizens as a good signal of where the preferred policy lies
24. The problem
in this case is transferred to the “reliability” of the sources of such messages. Is it realistic
to assume that people know the political preferences of other agents? It should be recognized
that some agents are able to signal their preferences in some way and that many organizations
are also able to establish a reputation in this sense. Trade unions, for example, are often
56 For example because it can seriously limit individual liberties.
57 See for example Grossman and Helpman (1997).36
able to coordinate people’s voting decisions because of their reputation. Note, however, that
the role of those organizations or opinion leaders is not necessarily to transmit information,
which could well mantain the same cost, but to convey messages that can coordinate people’s
actions: we can think of this as a possible direction for investigating the role of ideologies and
leadership in the political process.
The fact that this coordination failure can be more pronounced among low-income
citizens is consistent with good many stylized facts about voters’ turnout in elections,
participation in organizations, etc. Moreover, it may tell us something about the role of
political organizations in democracies, and in particular about the historical differences in
the way popular parties were organized compared with traditional liberal parties (i.e. parties
that were formed before universal suffrage). Our analysis may provide a rationale for the
strong organization and sense of the leadership typical of most popular parties: this is simply
consistent with the necessity for more effective coordination.
8. Summary and conclusion
This paper studies the role of citizens’ demand for political information in elections
and provides a possible explanation for the low empirical support encountered by political
economy models of income redistribution. This is done by linking the demand for political
information to voters’ responsiveness to political platforms and considering that incentives to
gather political information may derive from its relevance for private choices. This incentive
is generally asymmetric across the population, which may generate a heterogeneous degree
of awareness about policies. We consider a Downsian environment with vote-seeking parties
and the possibility of full committment to proposed platforms and show that, for a wide class
of utility functions, the ex ante value of political information is increasing in income and
therefore, in electoral periods, richer agents have higher probability of being informed on
proposed platforms. Since parties tend to target the citizens who are expected to be more
responsive to their proposed platforms, the political equilibrium involves policy convergence
not to the medianpreferred policy butto the policy preferred by the expected median informed
voter. Therefore redistribution can be expected to be, in general, less than that predicted
by the median voter result. Moreover, an increase in inequality will have two contrasting
effects: it will increase the desire of agents with income below the average for redistribution,
but it will also generate greater dispersion in the probability of being informed, resulting in37
partiestargeting higher-incomevoters. Thenet effectdependson manyvariablesandcannot be
determined in a simple way, as in traditional Downsian models. This is a possible explanation
for the fact that greater inequality in democratic countries does not very often lead to more
social spending or redistributive taxation.
Another consequence of our analysis is that to understand redistribution we should not
con¿ne our attention to relative inequality￿ if a large majority of the population have only a
subsistence income cannot be expected to obtain their preferred policies. At the same time,
some restrictions on the policy space that are apparently bene¿cial for the poorest segments of
the population may end up reducing their incentives to participate in public life and therefore
actually working against redistribution. Those perverse effects cannot be captured in models
that assume perfect information.
This analysis callsfor abetter understanding of mechanismsand institutions that, though
not being part of a formal de¿nition of democracy, are nevertheless quite important for its
functioning. If informed choices are generally better than uninformed ones, then having an
informed public opinion is an important characteristic of a truly democratic system. This
consideration seems to have been neglected in most of the public choice literature to date.
What is done here is clearly only a partial step, and further investigation is necessary.
From a theoretical point of view this approach can be extended to different and more
sophisticated models of political competition, where the effect of multidimensional policy
spaces and non-commitment on platforms can be examined taking the role of information
into account. Also, the link between lack of information and abstention deserves further
investigation. Some recent works establish this link in a clearly microfounded way but always
assuming ¿xed political alternatives and therefore focussing only on voters’ decision-making￿
il would clearly be interesting to consider the reactions of political parties, as in the present
paper.
Further empirical investigation is also necessary for a better understanding of these
processes, especially regarding parties’ reactions to citizens’ responsiveness.Proofs of results
Proposition 1(if @WE/￿ is a continuous function).
We divide the proof in 3 steps.
1) Let us consider the objective function
U /
/ iLE%m@WE/￿￿R/E/m￿￿_/￿ Note that LE￿￿ is a
continuous function and never changes its sign, and @WE/￿ and R/E/m￿￿_/ are both continuous











We do not know the actual value of e /c which depends on the inequality aversion of the agent,
and on j2
/￿ But we know that the optimal decision function derived under uncertainty is the
same as that derived under one of the possible deterministic functions. Then we can express
the solution to the utility maximization problem as  WE6cRc@WEe /￿￿￿
2) Note that for a homogeneous of degree ￿ utility function we have  WE6cR￿’6 WER￿
and therefore, T E6cRc@W￿’6T ERc@W￿￿ Let us de¿ne by h T E6cRc@W￿ the maximum utility
attainable when platforms are not observed. Suppose we have a given realization @WE/
￿￿￿ The
indirect utility function (ex post, i.e. if @W is observed) is thus T E6cRc@WE/
￿￿￿￿ From step 1,
we can express the solution when @W is not observed as  WE6cRc@WE/
￿￿￿￿ for some /
￿￿ 5 7/.
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The stated proposition follows from the fact that
YCE6￿
Y6 : f.￿
Proposition 1(if @WE/￿ is a discrete function)
As claimed in section 4, theorem 1 does not actually require the continuity of @WE/￿￿
Let us then assume a ¿nite but very large number of citizens ￿ and the functions R/E/￿ and
R0E0￿ as discrete probability functions with mass respectively over 7/ ’ i/￿mR/E/￿￿ : fj
￿ ’￿ c￿￿￿&cand 70 ’ i0,mR0E0,￿ : fjc,’￿ c￿￿￿c￿. Then, maintaining all other assumptions
holding, we can provide the following alternative proof.






















WEe /￿￿￿ ￿ T ERc@
WE/￿￿￿o
By the de¿nition of maximum value function we have T ERc@WEe /￿￿￿ ￿T ERc@WE/￿￿￿ ￿ f
;￿, which implies CE6me /￿￿’C E e /￿￿6c where CEe /￿￿’d
S&
￿’￿ RE/￿￿dT ERc@WEe /￿￿￿ ￿






from which the result is proved immediately￿.
Proposition 2The objective function is
4@ 
eM.
d6E￿ ￿Ze￿oh T n ^Ee￿d6E￿ ￿ Ze￿o￿
W ￿ ￿e
The ¿rst order condition is
￿Z6h T nd ^
￿
eEe￿6E￿ ￿ Ze￿ ￿ ^Ee￿Z6￿o￿
W ￿ ￿ ’f
Note that the second order condition is always satis¿ed:
d^
￿￿
eEe￿6E￿ ￿ Ze￿ ￿ 2^
￿
eEe￿6Zo￿
W ￿ f ;e




￿Zh T nd ^
￿
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d^
￿￿
eEeW￿6E￿ ￿ZeW￿ ￿ 2^
￿
eEeW￿6Zo￿W
As we have seen, the denominator is always negative, so
YeWE6c￿￿
Y6 : f if and only if































which means that A.1 is always satis¿ed. Therefore
YeWE6c￿￿
Y6 : f and
Y￿E6c￿￿/￿
Y6 : f￿







eEeW￿6E￿ ￿ ZeW￿ ￿2^
￿
eEeW￿6Zo￿W ￿ f ;e41
which in turn implies that
Y￿E6c￿￿/￿
Y￿ ￿ f ￿￿
Proposition 3By assumption 2 we know that for any platform pair E@￿c@ ￿￿ there exists one
type of agent e @ who is indifferent between the two and either
@& ￿ e @ , T E6&c@ ￿￿ :TE6&c@ ￿￿;@& ￿ e @
or









￿ ￿/E53￿E@￿￿}E@￿_@￿ Now consider
@
￿ ￿@ W￿ If party i chooses @
￿ then party ￿ will maximize Z￿E￿c￿￿ by setting @
￿￿ ’ @
￿ n ￿c for
an in¿nitesimal ￿ and getting votes -E@
￿￿
￿ .B u tt h e n@
￿
is not a best response to @
￿￿
since, by
continuity of the policy space, there exist @
￿￿ n￿ that maximizes ￿￿E￿c￿￿￿ But this is true for any
@
￿ ￿@ W￿ The same argument applies for any @
￿ :@ W￿ Therefore the unique Nash equilibrium
is given by E@W
￿c@ W





Lemma 1Note that the distribution ￿/E53￿E@￿￿ depends on the realized value of /￿ therefore
parties will make platform announcements contingent on /￿From platform convergence on
the expected Condorcet winner we have that the equilibrium can be expressed as @WE/￿￿ We










3￿E@￿m/￿}E@￿_@ ’f ￿ (A.2)
where @W indicates the Condorcet winner in the distribution }E@￿￿E53￿E@￿m/￿￿ 7E/c@W
}￿ is









Thus, applying the global theorem for implicit functions (Dini) we can say that there exists
a unique and continuous function @WE/￿ de¿ned in 7/ and having values in ￿ and such that
7E/c@WE/￿ ￿’f;/ 5 7/￿￿42






















since ￿E53￿E￿￿￿ is a monotonic decreasing function. This implies @W










and therefore, by single crossing in policy preferences, deviations above @W
￿ are never prof-
itable. By the same property, any subset of ￿ will have a Condorcet winner represented by
the policy @W preferred by the median voter in the considered subset.
Now remember that ￿/E6(￿￿’^EeWE6(￿￿￿￿ Therefore if / ’fthen ￿ ’ 0￿ Thus we
have .Eem6￿’
U
eWE6(0￿RE0￿_0￿ Also, eWE6(0￿ and RE0￿ are continuous functions, which




(0￿ :e WE6(0￿ ;0 5 70 then
Y.Ee￿6￿
Y6 : f and therefore ￿fE6￿ is increasing in 6 which implies that @WE/￿ has an upper
bound in @WEf￿ which is strictly lower than @W
￿.
To prove the second part of the statement, let us reconsider 7E/c@W￿￿ From the implicit








The denominator is clearly positive, while the sign of the nominator is ambiguous. There-
fore the sign of @W￿













Y/ ￿ f which implies that both integrals are negative. If
Y2￿E￿c￿￿
Y/Y@ ￿ f
then any value of
Y￿E53￿E@￿￿/￿
Y/ in the ¿rst integral is higher than any value of
Y￿E53￿E@￿￿/￿
Y/ in
the second one. Since the derivative is calculated in @WE/￿ then each side has a total mass43
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